A  Rebound Effect  After Stereotype Threat? by Schnarrenberger, Patrick
Macalester College
DigitalCommons@Macalester College
Psychology Honors Projects Psychology Department
May 2008
A "Rebound Effect" After Stereotype Threat?
Patrick Schnarrenberger
Macalester College, schnarrd@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/psychology_honors
This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Psychology Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information,
please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schnarrenberger, Patrick, "A "Rebound Effect" After Stereotype Threat?" (2008). Psychology Honors Projects. Paper 10.
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/psychology_honors/10
Stereotype Rebound 1 
 
Running Head:  STEREOTYPE REBOUND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A “Rebound Effect” After Stereotype Threat? 
Patrick Alan Schnarrenberger 
Kendrick Brown, Psychology Department 
Submitted 5/5/08 
Stereotype Rebound 2 
 
Abstract 
Two studies investigated a potential cognitive mediator for stereotype threat, a phenomenon 
whereby the mere threat of confirming a negative stereotype results in a performance deficit.  
It was hypothesized that people attempt to suppress stereotypes in memory during threatening 
situations, consuming cognitive resources, but that the suppression is released after the 
threatening situation has ended.  This results in a “rebound effect” and a subsequent increase 
in stereotyped thought.  The experiments failed to find a significant stereotype threat effect 
when examined individually, but when the data from the experiments were aggregated 
aggregated, a performance deficit was found.  However, because of the failure to find a 
significant performance deficit in any one experiment, the results to not directly bear on any 
potential rebound effect.  
Stereotype Rebound 3 
 
A “Rebound” Effect After Stereotype Threat? 
 Stereotype threat is a phenomenon in which the mere threat of confirming a negative 
stereotype in and of itself results in decreased performance on a given task.  This phenomenon 
is relatively robust, and has been demonstrated in such groups as women taking math tests 
(Quinn & Spencer, 2001), African Americans taking a verbal portion of the GRE (e.g. Steele 
& Aronson, 1995), and even White Americans taking the Implicit Attitudes Test (Frantz, 
Cuddy, Burnette, Ray, & Hart, 2004).  Current research makes less clear, however, exactly 
how stereotype threat occurs.  More specifically, the question remains as to what mediating 
processes cause the threat of confirming a negative stereotype to decrease performance on a 
given task.  The present study seeks to help clarify this issue by determining whether people 
engage in thought suppression with respect to stereotypes when performing a threatening task. 
 The earliest research on stereotype threat, conducted by Steele and Aronson (1995), 
focused on explaining the black / white standardized test gap.  It found that if African 
Americans were told that a test was diagnostic of their verbal abilities, they scored lower on 
the test than if they were told the test was investigating the psychological factors in solving 
verbal problems.  Steele and Aronson (1995) explained these findings by theorizing that the 
diagnosticity manipulation primed the participants’ awareness of stereotypes positing African 
Americans’ poor mental ability, and that the awareness of these stereotypes placed an extra 
affective load on these participants that resulted in decreased performance. 
Underlying Mechanisms 
 Subsequent research has attempted to pinpoint the underlying mechanism causing 
stereotype threat.  Following Steele and Aronson’s (1995) assumption that stereotype threat 
causes a burdensome affective load, a significant portion of these studies has focused on the 
affective underpinnings of stereotype threat.  The theory is that aversive affective states, such 
as increased arousal and anxiety, lead to distraction during the threatening task, and thus, 
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decreased performance.  For example, several studies have suggested that increased anxiety 
may be related to the stereotype threat phenomenon (Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, Steele, 
& Brown, 1999; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999).  Additionally, manipulations designed to 
decrease anxiety and arousal seem to moderate the effects of stereotype threat (Martens, Johns, 
Greenberg, & Schimel, 2002).   
 However, other studies make the link between affect and stereotype threat less clear.  
For example, Gonzales, Blanton and Williams (2002) found no difference in self-reported 
anxiety between conditions.  In another study, Brown and Josephs (1999) found no evidence 
that words related to performance anxiety were more accessible in memory during stereotype 
threat, implying that anxiety may not strongly mediate the phenomenon.  Other studies have 
yielded similar results (e.g. Oswald & Harvey, 2001, Schmader, 2002, Stone, Lynch, 
Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999).  Thus, the general picture that emerges from the literature 
regarding an affective mediator for stereotype threat is that negative affect may contribute to 
decreased performance, but that it is by no means the only factor involved. 
 Since anxiety does not seem to account fully for the damaging effects of stereotype 
threat, other research has sought to determine other possible mediators.  One possible 
explanation is that the stereotype negatively impacts an individual’s self-confidence to 
perform the given task and, in a self-fulfilling nature, subsequently disrupts the individual’s 
ability to perform on the task (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1966).  In their original study, Steele 
and Aronson (1995) provided a test of this hypothesis by administering a word completion 
task that provided an implicit measure of self-doubt after finishing the threatening task.  In 
support of the performance confidence hypothesis, they found that black participants in the 
threat condition spontaneously filled in the highest number of doubt-related words.  In another 
study using a similar measure of self-doubt as Steele and Aronson (1995), Stone (2002) 
induced stereotype threat for golf performance by relating golf to intelligence for African 
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Americans and natural ability for White Americans.  Stone then administered a word 
completion task for both groups of golfers measuring self-doubt.  Both threatened groups 
produced more doubt-related words than control groups.   
 However, although the studies cited above have found potential links between 
stereotype threat and self confidence, a number of studies have not (e.g. Aronson, Lustina, 
Good, Keough, Steele, & Brown, 1999, Keller, 2002, Kray, Thompson, & Galinski, 2001, 
Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999).  For example, Kray and colleagues (2001) conducted an 
experiment at an MBA program in which one member of either a male-female or a male-male 
negotiating dyad were either told that a negotiating exercise was highly diagnostic of 
important, stereotypically male managerial skills, or that the exercise was simply illustrative 
of classic buyer-seller bargaining. Additionally, Kray and colleagues administered a self-
confidence to the participants across both conditions.  Although female participants exhibited 
a performance deficit in the threat condition relative to the male participants, they showed no 
corresponding change in confidence levels. Thus, although performance confidence may 
partially mediate stereotype threat, current evidence suggests that this construct cannot fully 
account for stereotype threat’s damaging effects. 
 Another body of research has examined possible behavioral mediators for stereotype 
threat.  Some researchers have investigated whether stereotype threat damages performance 
by causing the target of the threat to change the amount of effort expended in the threatening 
task.  According to this view, stereotype threat would either cause the threatened person to 
decrease the effort expended, resulting in decreased performance, or drastically increase the 
amount of effort expended, resulting in overexertion and, ultimately, decreased performance.  
However, a variety of studies have shown that neither of these theories is a good explanation 
for the negative effects of stereotype threat (e.g. Aronson et al., 1999, Gonzales, Blanton, & 
Williams, 2002, Keller, 2002, Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003, Smith & White, 2002).  
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 Another possible behavioral mediator of stereotype threat is self-handicapping, or an 
individual’s attempt to protect the self by either behaving or claiming to have behaved in such 
a way that a poor performance could be attributed to external circumstances (Leary & 
Shepperd, 1986).  Applied to stereotype threat, self-handicapping implies that threatened 
individuals may claim more self-handicaps in response to a threatening stereotype.  This 
hypothesis has received partial support in subsequent research.  For example, Stone (2002) 
found that threatened individuals opt not to take practice swings when preparing for a golf 
task.  Additionally, Quinn & Spencer (2001) found that threatened females were less able to 
formulate strategies for solving math word problems.  However, as in the case of the other 
potential mediators for stereotype threat discussed above, the majority of studies investigating 
self-handicapping as a potential mediator have provided null results (e.g. Croizet & Claire, 
1998, Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003, Kray et al., 2001, Shih et al., 1999). 
 An additional potential mediator suggested by Smith (2004) that is not easily classified 
into affective, behavioral, or cognitive categories relates to the adoption of performance-
avoidance versus performance-approach achievement goals.  Achievement goal research 
posits that performance expectancies determine the type of achievement goal adopted (Elliot 
& Church, 1997).  A high performance expectancy results in a performance-approach 
achievement goal, wherein the goal is to demonstrate competence, whereas a low 
performance expectancy generates a performance-avoidance goal, wherein the goal is to avoid 
demonstrating incompetence.  Several researchers have found that performance-approach 
achievement goals generally result in positive outcomes, while performance-avoidance goals 
generally result in negative outcomes (e.g. Barron & Harackiewicz, 2001, Elliot & Church, 
1997).  Moreover, Smith, Sansone, and White (2007) have found that women with high 
achievement motivation who undergo stereotype threat spontaneously adopt performance-
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avoidance goals.  However, the literature linking stereotype threat to achievement goals is still 
in its infancy, and is unlikely to provide a complete mediator for stereotype threat. 
Thought Suppression as a Mediator 
 Although the above research focuses mainly on the behavioral and phenomenological 
underpinnings of stereotype threat, another body of research focuses on possible cognitive 
factors of the phenomenon.  For example, Croizet, Després, Gauzins, Huguet, Leyens, and 
Méot, (2004) presented an adaptation of the Progressive Matrices Test to participants with a 
perceived reputation for intellectual inferiority.  Concurrent with the Progressive Matrices 
Test, Croizet and colleagues administered several autonomic measures of cognitive load.  
When the task was presented as a measure of intellectual ability, people belonging to 
stereotyped groups not only exhibited performance deficits, but also exhibited evidence of 
greater cognitive load than people from non-stereotyped groups.  This study implies a link 
between a person’s available cognitive resources and stereotype threat.  In another study 
investigating the cognitive factors of stereotype threat, Schmader and Johns (2003) found that 
stereotype threat reduces participants’ scores on a working memory task, even though the task 
was presented as being unrelated to the task triggering the stereotype threat.  To explain these 
results, Schmader and Johns conjecture that cognitive resources might be consumed in 
suppressing thoughts relating to the target stereotype.  Indeed, other research, such as that of 
Spencer (2003), indicates that targets of a stereotype might often try to suppress thoughts 
related to that stereotype.  This implies that cognitive factors may mediate some of the 
negative ramifications of stereotype threat.  Thus, the extra effort expended in suppressing 
thoughts related to a stereotype seems to be a reasonable explanation for the working memory 
deficits elicited in Schmader and Johns’ research. 
 With respect to thought suppression, previous studies have shown that suppressing 
thoughts actually makes those thoughts more accessible in memory.  Wegner and Erber (1992) 
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demonstrated that attempting to suppress a target word in a high-stress situation resulted in 
longer reaction times in naming colors and more responses matching that target word when 
the word is primed than in a control condition.  To explain these results, they proposed a 
model, termed the ironic process model, whereby the mind utilizes two simultaneous 
processes to suppress thoughts, one controlled and one automatic.  The automatic process 
scans the contents of working memory to detect traces of the unwanted thought, which would 
indicate a lapse in mental control.  If such a thought is detected, the controlled process, which 
is intentional and limited by available working memory, seeks to replace this thought with a 
suitable distracter thought.  The implication of this model is that at any given time, a person 
attempting to suppress a thought should be highly sensitized to the presence of the unwanted 
item.  Thus, when high-stress situations trigger a large cognitive load, the controlled process 
becomes subsequently less able to replace unwanted thoughts with distracter items and 
unwanted thoughts become even more accessible than if the person did not engage in thought 
suppression at all. 
 This theory has since been applied to stereotype suppression.  The reasoning goes that 
since there is a present social norm prohibiting the explicit expression of stereotyped attitudes, 
people who have stereotypes made salient to them have an incentive to consciously suppress 
these thoughts.  However, according to the ironic process theory, people attempting to 
suppress stereotyped thoughts who are under a disruptive mental load should have these 
thoughts hyperaccessible in working memory, and thus when these people discontinue their 
thought suppression effort, they should experience a “rebound effect” where they are hyper-
aware of the unwanted stereotype.  Consistent with this model, Macrae and colleagues (1994) 
show that when people try to suppress stereotyped thoughts, they subsequently express more 
negative stereotyped thoughts than people in a control condition.  Thus, stereotype 
suppression may actually lead to more stereotyped thinking than may otherwise occur. 
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 These results have important implications for people in situations where stereotype 
threat is triggered.  First, they imply that if a person engages in thought suppression during the 
specific task, as long as this task is sufficiently difficult and uses sufficient cognitive 
resources, suppression efforts should use cognitive resources that would normally be allocated 
to the task at hand, resulting in decreased performance.  However, if the task is not 
sufficiently difficult, there should be no stereotype threat effect.  Consistent with this 
prediction, O’Brien and Crandall (2003) have found that when women are administered 
simple math tests, which presumably do not use sufficient cognitive resources to conflict with 
the stereotype suppression process, they do not exhibit the stereotype threat effect.  However, 
when the difficulty is scaled up, increasing cognitive load, performances in the stereotype 
threat condition decrease with respect to controls.  Second, the results imply that people in a 
threat condition engaging in thought suppression should experience a rebound effect after the 
thought control process is relaxed, and thus stereotyped thoughts should be hyperaccessible 
after the threat condition has ended.  This rebound effect could represent post-test ruminations 
about either the test itself or the individual’s performance on said test.  However, the reason 
finding a rebound effect after stereotype threat is important is that it would re-emphasize the 
value of considering the cognitive approach when devising interventions to reduce or 
eliminate the stereotype threat effect.  Additionally, although some of the theories regarding 
the underlying mechanisms for stereotype threat discussed above appear to have more 
empirical support than others, it is important to emphasize that these theories are not mutually 
exclusive.  The overall picture that emerges from the literature is that no one factor fully 
mediates stereotype threat.  Instead, the threat of confirming a negative stereotype about one’s 
group triggers a cascade of changes at multiple levels of analysis, including, but not 
necessarily limited to, the affective, behavioral, phenomenological, and cognitive.  These 
changes then combine and interact, producing a performance deficit.  In a phenomenon as 
Stereotype Rebound 10 
 
complex as stereotype threat, multiple psychological approaches are not only beneficial, but 
necessary for devising effective interventions.  Thus, this study attempted to use the fine grain 
of analysis provided by the cognitive approach to describe one of the proximate factors 
responsible for the destructive effects of stereotype threat with the ultimate goal of allowing 
more targeted interventions at the cognitive level. 
 In service to the above goal, the present study sought to provide a conclusive link 
between stereotype threat and thought suppression, and subsequently further elucidate the 
means by which the cognitive mediators of stereotype threat operate.  First, I will attempt to 
show that females engaging in a threatening math task engage in thought suppression during 
the task, resulting in a “rebound effect”, where unwanted stereotypes are hyperaccessible after 
the completion of the task.  Second, I hope to show that when this thought suppression is 
eliminated, the negative effects of stereotype threat are alleviated. 
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 was designed to establish a firm link between stereotype threat and 
thought suppression.  Participants engaged in a math task that has been framed as either 
having been shown to produce gender differences or as having been shown to be neutral with 
respect to gender.  Each participant, regardless of how the math task was framed, will 
complete two lexical decision tasks designed to measure the activation of stereotypes related 
to women, one during the math task and one afterwards.  If the threat manipulation is 
effective and thought suppression does play a role in stereotype threat, I expect to see two 
main patterns of results.  First of all, participants in the threat condition should score lower on 
the math task than participants in the control condition.  Secondly, participants in the threat 
condition should show relatively more stereotype activation after the math task is completed 
as compared to during the task because of the rebound effect.  Participants in the control 
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condition should show a similar amount of stereotype activation both during and after the 
math task. 
Method 
Participants   
The participants consisted of 45 female Macalester college students of ages 18 to 21, 
who were told that they were being recruited for a study researching gender differences in 
math ability.  Of these, 33 participated for course credit, while 12 were entered into a random 
drawing for a $50 gift certificate to local merchants.  Additionally, the data from 5 
participants were excluded from the analysis, 4 because they were non-native English 
speakers and 1 because the debriefing revealed that she had guessed the true motive for the 
experiment. 
Materials   
There were three primary materials for this experiment, namely one 45-minute math 
section from the general Graduate Register Examination (GRE) consisting of a total of 29 
questions and two separate lexical decision tasks, which were used as measures of stereotype 
activation.  The GRE math section was divided into approximately equal halves, with one 
extra question assigned to the first half because the experimenter perceived that the first half 
was the least difficult.  Following the work of several other researchers (e.g. Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995, Mussweiler, 2006, Parrott, Zeichner, & Hoover, 2006), the 
lexical decision tasks each consisted of 10 words and 10 non-words.  Of the 10 words, 5 were 
target words consisting of adjectives highly associated with stereotypically female traits (e.g. 
romantic, gentle, emotional), while 5 were filler words consisting of adjectives irrelevant to 
stereotypical female traits (e.g. healthy, foreign, straight).  The stereotypically feminine 
words were obtained through a pre-test in which 20 female participants were asked to rate 51 
personality words on a scale from 1 to 9 as to their masculinity and femininity.  The 10 
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highest-scoring feminine words with mean femininity scores of at least 7 were selected for 
use in the two lexical decision tasks.  Lists of the non-words, filler words, and target words 
are given in the Appendix. 
Procedure   
Each participant was randomly assigned to either the threat or no-threat condition.  In 
both conditions, the participant entered the testing room, after which the (male) experimenter 
asked the participant to sign a consent form and fill out some basic demographic information.  
In the threat condition, this demographic information contained a question asking the gender 
of the participant, which served to make gender a salient characteristic.  The experimenter 
then explained that the participant was going to take the first half of a 40-minute math test.  
Halfway through the math test, the participant would also complete a short verbal task to 
“cleanse the palette” before completing the second half of the math test.  Additionally, the 
experimenter explained in the experimental condition that the math test had been previously 
shown to produce gender differences, while in the control condition, the experimenter 
described the test as having been shown to be “gender neutral.”  The experimenter then 
administered one half of a 45-minute GRE math section.  After 20 minutes, the experimenter 
collected the first half of the test and led the participant to a separate chamber, where the 
participant completed the first lexical decision task.  Upon completion of this lexical decision 
task, the participant was led back to the original testing chamber, where the experimenter then 
administered the remaining half of the GRE math section.  After 20 minutes, the experimenter 
collected the final portion of the math test.  However, before the participant left the testing 
chamber, the experimenter explained that he had a “friend” for whom he was doing a favor.  
The experimenter then explained that this “friend” needed more data, and was using a verbal 
task very similar to the one the participant had taken earlier, and the experimenter 
subsequently asked whether the participant would be willing to complete this second verbal 
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task.  If the participant agreed, she was led to a third room to complete the second lexical 
decision task, after which she was probed for suspicion and then thoroughly debriefed.  If the 
participant did not agree, the experimenter proceeded directly to the debriefing.  No 
participants refused to complete this second verbal task. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 The math test score data were first analyzed to ensure the threat manipulation was 
effective.  The answer to one question in the first half of the math test was found to be 
ambiguous, and answers to that question were consequently excluded from the analysis.  The 
resultant mean test score of participants in the no-threat condition was 16.05, while the mean 
test score in the threat condition was 14.70, which is slightly lower than the test score in the 
no-threat condition.   A one-tailed independent groups t-test, however, reveals that this 
difference was not significant, t(38) = 1.26, p = ns.  This implies that the threat manipulation 
was not effective in generating a stereotype threat effect.  The proceeding analyses, therefore, 
should be considered with this in mind. 
Stereotyped Thought Data 
 These data consist of response times to lexical decision tasks.  The tasks each 
contained 10 non-words, 5 stereotypically female target words, and 5 stereotype-unrelated 
filler words.  Each lexical decision task could be administered either during or after the math 
test. 
 Inaccurate responses were first excluded from the data, and the resulting response 
times were submitted to a logarithmic transformation.  These data were then grouped by time, 
which could have been during or after the math test, and threat level, which could have been 
high or low.  Means and standard deviations for each participant’s data were then calculated 
according to these groups, and individual response times more than 3 standard deviations 
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from the participant mean were excluded from the analysis.  Participant means that then 
consisted of  only 2 response times were also excluded.  The preceding steps resulted in less 
than 5% elimination of response time data, and resulted in zero excluded participant means.  
The grand means calculated by time and condition of the resulting mean participant reaction 
times are presented in Table 1.  Note that while I used the logarithmically transformed 
reaction times for our analyses, only the untrasformed means are presented in the table. 
 As can be seen from the table, the reaction times for the high and low threat conditions 
do not appear to differ significantly.  A 2 (threat) x 2 (time) repeated measures mixed 
ANOVA confirms this fact, with no significant main effect for threat, F(1, 38) < 1, p = ns.  
However, there does appear to be a difference for time, a fact which is confirmed through the 
above repeated measures mixed ANOVA, F(1, 38) = 6.835, p < .05.  There is no significant 
interaction between threat and time, F(1, 38) < 1, p = ns.  Thus, all participants appear to have 
responded faster to the stereotypically female words following the math task, and this pattern 
did not vary according to threat condition. 
Discussion 
 The main hypotheses of this study were that participants who undergo stereotype 
threat would experience more stereotyped thought after the threatening task than during, and 
additionally that these participants would experience a similar amount of stereotyped thought 
as non-threatened participants during the task, but more stereotyped thought afterwards.  
Because of this experiment’s failure to find a significant effect for stereotype threat, and 
because the main hypotheses of this experiment are predicated upon finding effects for 
stereotype threat, the results of this experiment do not clearly support or refute any of these 
hypotheses.  However, a few explanations for why the experiment failed to find a significant 
stereotype threat effect do deserve some examination. 
Stereotype Rebound 15 
 
 The first, and perhaps most obvious, explanation for the failure of the stereotype threat 
manipulation was that the manipulation was simply ineffective, and therefore failed to 
produce a measurable difference in performance between the two groups.  However, in light 
of the fact that the threat manipulation used for this experiment has been successfully used 
several times in the stereotype threat literature (e.g. Spencer et al., 1999, O’Brien & Crandall, 
2003), this explanation seems a bit premature unless no other convincing one exists.   
 Another potential explanation for the failure of the threat manipulation is that 
stereotype threat was present in the current experiment, as evidenced by the difference in 
mean test scores between groups, but that effect was not large enough to be detected given the 
number of participants used in the experiment.  Given the fact that this experiment, after the 
elimination of 5 participants, only used 20 participants per between-subject condition, and 
given the fact that previous research has used closer to 30 or more subjects per between-
subject condition (e.g. Marx & Stapel, 2006, O’Brien & Crandall, 2003, Davis, Aronson, & 
Salinas, 2006), it seems likely that this may have played a role in the failure of the threat 
effect to reach significance.  Indeed, a post-hoc power analysis indicates that given the effect 
size observed, the study would have required approximately 80 participants to achieve 
significance, lending further credence to this interpretation. 
 One final potential explanation for the failure of the threat manipulation is that 
stereotype threat was present in both the threat and the no-threat conditions.  Prior to 
participating, each participant believed that the experiment was investigating potential gender 
differences in math ability, a fact which may have been enough to evoke stereotype threat in 
and of itself.  Although the math test was described as being “gender neutral” in the control 
condition, this may not have been enough to eliminate the threat of confirming the negative 
stereotype about women’s math ability. 
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 Clearly, the reasons for the failure of the stereotype threat manipulation are ambiguous.  
However, the picture becomes even less clear upon consideration of the lexical decision data.  
Because lexical decision latencies were significantly shorter after the math test, these data 
seem to suggest that thought suppression was present in both the threat and no-threat groups.  
However, because no firm link has yet been established between thought suppression and 
stereotype threat, it would not be logically sound to take this as disambiguating evidence to 
sort through the competing explanations for the failure of the threat manipulation.  Indeed, 
there may be other reasons for this difference in lexical decision latencies, since a number of 
participants mentioned that the second half of the math test seemed harder than the first.  This 
is corroborated through a paired-group t-test, which reveals that participants scored 
marginally significantly lower on the second half of the math test, t(38) = 1.863, p = .07.  This 
suggests that test difficulty was confounded with time.  It should be noted that although 
originally, the two halves of the math test consisted of unequal numbers of questions, this t-
test is still legitimate because the answers to one question in the first half of the math test 
were excluded because of ambiguity, as noted in the results section above.  Since O’Brien & 
Crandall (2003) have found that increasing test difficulty tends to exaggerate the difference in 
performance on math tasks among women in threat and no-threat groups, one could posit that 
the more difficult half of the math test led to greater stereotype activation, which led to the 
difference in lexical decision latencies.  This explanation for the lexical decision latencies 
cannot be easily dismissed. 
 In sum, due to both problems in the experiment methodology and an insufficient 
sample size, the results of Experiment 1 are ambiguous, and further investigation is needed to 
clarify the data. 
Experiment 2 
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 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to disambiguate the competing interpretations of 
Experiment 1.  Because Experiment 1 failed to find a significant difference in test scores 
despite using a threat manipulation that has been established in previous literature (e.g. 
Spencer et al., 1999, O’Brien & Crandall, 2003), one goal of Experiment 2 was to increase the 
power of the experiment through larger sample sizes across conditions.  The problem of a lack 
of a significant threat manipulation will hopefully resolve itself with the resultant increase in 
statistical power. 
 The other major goal of Experiment 2 was to resolve the experimental confound of test 
difficulty and time.  This way, differences in lexical decision latencies could be successfully 
attributed to differences in when the latencies were measured. 
 The predictions of Experiment 2 are identical to those of Experiment 1, namely that 
participants in the threat conditions should score lower on the math test than participants in 
the control condition, participants in the threat condition should show greater stereotype 
activation after the test than during, and that participants in the control condition should show 
a similar amount of stereotype activation during and after the test. 
Method 
Participants 
 The participants consisted of 46 female Macalester college students of ages 18 to 21 
who were told that they were being recruited for a study researching gender differences in 
math ability.  Of these, 15 participated for course credit, while 31 were entered into a random 
drawing for a $50 gift certificate to local merchants.  Additionally, the data from 4 
participants were excluded from the analysis, 2 because they were non-native speakers of 
English and 2 because they had been alerted as to the goal of the experiment prior to 
participation. 
Materials 
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 The materials for Experiment 2 were identical to those in Experiment 1 except that the 
order of the questions used in the GRE math section for Experiment 1 was randomized.  
Groups of questions that referred to a common graph or data set were randomized in blocks.  
One question from the test was also eliminated because of potential ambiguity.  Finally, the 
test was administered to a group of 4 participants to ensure both that each half of the math test 
required approximately the same amount of time and that each half was perceived as being 
equally difficult. 
Procedure 
 The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that in Experiment 1 with two 
exceptions.  First, the order of administration for the two halves of the math test was 
counterbalanced across participants.  Second, both to compensate for the elimination of the 
one ambiguous question and to increase overall test difficulty, participants were only allowed 
15 minutes for each section of the math test. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 As in Experiment 1, the math test scores were first analyzed to ensure that the threat 
manipulation was effective.  First, because of the large amount of variability in the test scores, 
any scores more than two standard deviations from the mean were excluded from the analysis.  
This resulted in the exclusion of three participants from the analysis.   
The subsequent mean test score for the threat condition is 14.95, which is slightly 
lower than 16.68, the mean test score in the no-threat condition.  A one-tailed independent 
groups t-test reveals, however, that this difference only approaches significance, t(37) = 1.50, 
p = .143.  This implies that the threat manipulation was only partially successful in generating 
stereotype threat. 
Stereotyped Thought Data 
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 The stereotyped thought data consisted of reaction times to lexical decisions on 10 
non-words, 5 stereotypically female target words, and 5 stereotype-unrelated filler words.  
Additionally, each lexical decision task could be presented either during or after the 
threatening math test. 
 Inaccurate responses were first excluded from the data, and the resulting responses 
were submitted to a logarithmic transformation.  As in Experiment 1, the responses were then 
grouped by time, which could have been during or after the math test, and threat level, which 
could have been high or low.  Means and standard deviations were then calculated according 
to these groups, and individual response times more than three standard deviations from the 
participant means were excluded from the analysis.  Any resulting participant means that 
consisted of only two individual response times were also excluded from the analysis.  The 
preceding steps resulted in the elimination of less than 5% of the total data, and the 
elimination of zero participant means.  The grand means calculated by time and condition of 
the resulting mean participant reaction times are presented in Table 2.  Note that while we 
used logarithmically transformed data to perform the analysis, Table 2 shows only 
untransformed data. 
 As can be seen from the table, reaction times for all conditions do not appear to differ 
significantly.  A 2 (threat) x 2 (time) repeated measures mixed ANOVA confirms this fact, as 
there is no significant main effect for threat, F(1, 39) < 1, p = ns; time, F(1, 39) < 1, p = ns; or 
for the interaction between threat and time, F(1, 39) < 1, p = ns.  Thus, participant response 
times did not significantly vary according to time or condition. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 was designed with the twin goals of eliminating some of the competing 
interpretations of the data of Experiment 1 and increasing Experiment 1’s overall 
experimental power.  Experiment 2 succeeded on the first count, eliminating the experimental 
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confound of difficulty with time with respect to the lexical decision tasks, but failed on the 
second, as Experiment 2’s sample size offered virtually no increase over that of Experiment 1.  
Additionally, the marginal significance of the stereotype threat effect in Experiment 2, 
combined with the universally non-significant results the lexical decision data, render it 
exceedingly difficult to draw firm conclusions based the results of Experiment 2.   
 First, although this experiment failed to find evidence of thought suppression during 
the math task, one may not conclude from this that thought suppression does not play a role 
during stereotype threat, for much the same reasons that one could not draw this conclusion 
based on the results of Experiment 1.  Given the fact that the difference in test scores between 
the threat and no-threat groups was only marginally significant, the possibility remains that an 
increase in either statistical power or the power of the threat manipulation could result in a 
corresponding increase in the ease with which a potential rebound effect could be detected via 
the twin lexical decision tasks.  Thus, as in Experiment 1, the results of this experiment do not 
bear directly upon the main hypotheses of this study, even though the experiment found 
evidence of a trend of lower test scores in the threat condition. 
 As for the reason that this experiment found only a trend in the direction of stereotype 
threat, rather than a significant difference, the three primary explanations investigated in 
Experiment 1, and the conclusions drawn from those investigations, still hold.  Thus, it still 
seems premature to draw the conclusion that the threat manipulation was simply ineffective 
given the fact that it has been used previously in the literature (e.g. Spencer et al., 1999, 
O’Brien & Crandall, 2003).  However, it remains possible both that claiming that the math 
test in the control condition was “gender neutral” was insufficient to fully eliminate the threat 
of confirming the negative stereotype about women’s math ability and that Experiment 2 
simply offered too little experimental power to detect the threat effect.  Once again, a post-hoc 
power analysis lends some credence to the low experimental power interpretation, indicating 
Stereotype Rebound 21 
 
that around 80 participants were required to achieve significance given the observed effect 
size. 
 Finally, it is interesting to note that concurrent with the elimination of test difficulty as 
an experimental confound with time in Experiment 2, the differences in lexical decision 
latencies between the two lexical decision tasks disappeared.  Although additional differences 
in methodology between Experiment 1 and 2 do not permit us to make a direct comparison 
between the two experiments, this fact still seems to suggest that more difficult tasks lead to 
greater stereotype activation, an idea to which we shall return in the general discussion. 
General Discussion 
 The original motivation for this study was to establish a role for thought suppression 
during stereotype threat, which would further highlight the importance of the cognitive 
perspective in explaining the proximate processes underlying the stereotype threat 
phenomenon.  Although both experiments in this study failed to sufficiently demonstrate a 
stereotype threat effect, making it difficult to speak to the original intent of the study, pooling 
the test score data from both experiments partially alleviates this problem.  The pooled data 
result in a mean test score of 14.83 for the threat condition and 16.36 for the no-threat 
condition.  A one-tailed, independent groups t-test reveals that this difference is marginally 
significant, t(77) = 1.79, p = .082.  It is worth emphasizing that the procedures across these 
two experiments were different and so pooling the results of the two experiments is not 
strictly valid.  However, changes to the experimental procedure across experiments would 
serve to increase the overall variability in the pooled test scores, which would render 
significance harder to achieve.  Thus, the marginal significance of the overall mean test scores 
in the threat and no-threat groups provides compelling evidence that this study’s difficulty in 
demonstrating stereotype threat lay not in a quirk of procedure or an idiosyncratic participant 
pool, but was rather an artifact of insufficient statistical power. 
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 The stereotyped thought data takes on a new light in consideration of the above 
conclusion.  Although the null results exhibited in Experiment 2 are still ambiguous in that 
they themselves may also be due to insufficient statistical power, the knowledge that 
stereotype threat may have been present below the experiments’ respective detection 
thresholds lends some credence to the hypothesis that stereotype activation occurs at a similar 
(low) level during both the threatening and the non-threatening tasks.  If true, this would 
imply that thought suppression does not play a major role in driving stereotype threat, though, 
as I have already argued, I am reluctant to draw this conclusion on the basis of such 
impoverished data. 
  However, the truly interesting result of this study, as mentioned in Experiment 2, was 
obtained almost by accident.  This is the fact that increasing the difficulty of one half of the 
math test led to greater stereotype activation after that half, while eliminating the difference in 
difficulty between the two halves of the math test eliminated the disparity in stereotype 
activation.  One must be cautious when interpreting these results, as several confounding 
factors vary systematically with the difficulty disparity as a result of differences in 
experimental methodology, and besides which, any explanation for these results will be 
decidedly post-hoc.  However, these results do tentatively suggest a link between stereotype 
activation and difficulty, a link which is consistent with the thought suppression hypothesis.  
As O’Brien and Crandall (2003) have found, test difficulty exaggerates the stereotype threat 
effect, which could result from the extra cognitive resources required for more difficult tests 
coupled with the resources required to suppress stereotypical thoughts.  Thus, more difficult 
tests result in a rebound effect upon completion because they trigger thought suppression, 
while less difficult tests do not exhibit a rebound effect because they do not trigger thought 
suppression.  However, this explanation assumes that the participants in both experiments 
performed in this study treated each test as separate entities.  In other words the explanation 
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assumes that, upon completion of the first half of the math test, the participant perceived that 
the math context was over, as the participants presumably did when they were taken to 
complete the “second study”.  Additionally, even if one takes this interpretation at face value, 
we still do not know the direction of causality between stereotype activation and the increased 
performance deficit exhibited during more difficult tasks.  Essentially, greater stereotype 
activation could cause the increased performance deficit or vice-versa. 
 Unfortunately, we are left with essentially the same question at the end of this study as 
we had at the beginning, namely whether thought suppression plays a role during stereotype 
threat, as evidenced by a rebound effect after the threatening task.  The evidence presented in 
this study is ambiguous at best, and the experiments performed demonstrated insufficient 
power to draw any meaningful conclusions. The study may have accidentally uncovered a 
link between stereotype activation and test difficulty, but because it was not directly testing 
for such a link, the interpretation of these data remains ambiguous.  In the eyes of this 
experimenter, it remains a distinct possibility that thought suppression plays a role in 
stereotype threat.  However, determining this fact with any certainty will be a task for future 
research. 
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Table 1 
Mean reaction times (ms) in Experiment 1 for each condition during and after the math task. 
  Threat No-Threat Total 
During  546.24 530.66 538.06 
After 511.33 507.09 509.10 
Total 528.78 518.88  
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Table 2 
Mean reaction times (ms) in Experiment 2 for each condition during and after the math task. 
  Threat No-Threat Total 
During  538.68 533.45 536.13 
After 534.81 548.07 541.28 
Total 536.75 540.76  
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Appendix 1:  Target, filler, and non-words used for the lexical decision tasks 
Target words:  Gentle, expressive, romantic, warm, intuitive, caring, affectionate, sensitive, 
tender, emotional 
Filler words:  Lethal, hurried, healthy, foreign, straight, bumpy, hungry, smelly, receptive, 
instinctive 
Non-words:  Opern, unsive, poweep, stalom, wotard, rhinde, twampte, ghwurche, freuste, 
kningly, slockish, throod, sprinked, vaipish, kwoizlet, cleique, zursty, thrighbed, gheemel, 
skelicee 
